The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss these effects by introducing three kinds of risk: risk on the environmental quality, risk on the impact of pollution and risk on the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that risk increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N -th order risk changes.
environmental degradation and eventually improving environmental quality is now a priority for many governments. 1 The economic effects of pollution and environment degradation have been widely analyzed in the literature. On one hand, these papers show the relevance of environmental change for different economic issues. In this field, in particular, the effects on economic growth and welfare have been both studied from a theoretical standpoint and quantified by simulations and calibrations. 2 On the other hand, many papers examine appropriate policies in order to reduce environmental degradation. Two policy instruments are most important. The first is abatement policy, which is an intervention, financed by taxation, which directly improves environmental quality. The second is the so-called "Pigouvian tax", first proposed by Pigou (1924) , who argued that negative externality due to pollution can be internalized in a competitive market by introducing a tax equal to the social marginal damage caused by environmental degradation. 3 Although there is a broad consensus on the idea that pollution has important effects for environmental conditions and human life, we also find a widespread uncertainty on the features and the sizes of these effects. A good example of this is the wellknown issue of global warming. First, although the majority of scientists in the climate research community assert that there has been an increase in temperatures due to human activities, others disagree. 4 Second, even if we believe that global warming is taking place, there is widespread uncertainty on how temperatures will rise 5 and how this will impact on human systems. 6 The aim of this work is to study the effects of uncertainty on the environment with specific reference to its influence on the implementation of policies used to counteract environmental deterioration. For this purpose we introduce three types of risk, i.e. 1 A recent important signal of this importance is the attention paid in all developed countries to the United Nation Summits on Climate Change in Copenhagen (December 2009) and Cancun (December 2010) . 2 For a survey of these issues see Baumol and Oates (1988) , Nordhaus (1994) , Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Xepapadeas (2005) . 3 For an analysis of the design and the effects of these two policies see respectively Gradus and Smulders (1993) , Smulders and Gradus (1996) , Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) and Gupta and Barman (2009) for abatement policy and Pigou (1924) , Baumol and Oates (1988) , Mohtadi (1996) and Helfand et al. (2003) for Pigouvian tax. Note that other possible instruments for public intervention in environmental economics, not analysed in this work, are property rights, binding quota restrictions and markets for pollution permits. 4 On this see, for instance, the debate between the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). 5 As emphasized by the IPCC: 'Models differ considerably in their estimates of the strength of different feedbacks in the climate system, particularly cloud feedbacks, oceanic heat uptake and carbon cycle feedbacks, although progress has been made in these areas. Also, the confidence in projections is higher for some variables (e.g. temperature) than for others (e.g. precipitation) , and it is higher for larger spatial scales and longer time averaging periods ' (IPCC 2007, p. 73) (IPCC 2007, p. 73) .risk on the environmental quality level, risk on the effect of pollution and risk on the impact of the abatement policy.
and 'Projections of climate change and its impacts beyond about 2050 are strongly scenario-and model-dependent, and improved projections would require improved understanding of sources of uncertainty and enhancements in systematic observation networks'
To our knowledge the effects of uncertainty on the environment was studied in the literature only from a standpoint different from that considered in this work. In particular, among the papers examining this issue, Heal (1984) and Keeler et al. (2004) study the effect of uncertainty on the time of a future change in productivity caused by pollution, inserting an uncertain climate threshold in a model of optimal depletion and in a DICE growth model. 7 Ulph and Ulph (1997) and Pindyck (2000 Pindyck ( , 2002 analyse the optimal timing for the implementation of an abatement policy in a real option framework. Gollier et al. (2000) investigate conditions on utility functions which ensure that scientific progress reducing uncertainty on the distribution of damage related to consumption (in particular pollution damage) induce an earlier prevention effort. Finally, Soretz (2007) examines optimal pollution taxation in an endogenous growth model where productivity is affected by uncertainty on environmental quality on the basis of a relationship evolving as a stochastic Wiener process.
This paper presents three main differences with regard to the previous literature. First, the papers cited above either do not explicitly consider environmental policies, or, as in the majority of the cases, they study the effect of uncertainty on abatement tax.
In this work, we analyze the effect of environmental uncertainty on both Pigouvian and abatement tax, considered both as separate instruments and joint instruments.
Second, the papers cited above make specific assumptions about the distribution of the random process describing risk while our paper does not. 8 We thus obtain general conclusions which do not depend on the specific distribution introduced. In this field, we also introduce a further generalization, extending our results to the case of the so called 'N -th order risk change '. 9 Finally, the existing literature studies a one-argument utility framework where utility depends only on consumption. This implies that environmental risk affects agents' preferences through its effect on consumption, because it impacts on productivity. Environmental risk, however, has mainly a direct effect on utility since environmental quality determines a specific dimension of agents utility, different from consumption.
This framework is clearly related to a recent strand of literature analyzing the effect of the background risk. Background risk is in fact a second source of risk, distinct from financial risk, studied in a two-argument utility model, where the second argument of the utility is related to variables such as health status or environmental quality. In this literature, Pratt (1988) , Finkelshtain et al. (1999) and Courbage (2001) study the effect of background risk, and thus of environmental risk, on risk aversion. Courbage and Rey (2007) and Menegatti (2009a,b) analyse the effects of background risk on precautionary saving respectively under some specific assumptions on bivariate risk distribution and in the case of small risks. Finally Denuit et al. (2011) generalize the analysis of optimal saving and investment in the presence of two correlated risks, financial and background. This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyses the effect of risk on optimal Pigouvian taxation. Section 4 studies the implication of risk in a model with abatement policies. Section 5 examines a model where both Pigouvian tax and abatement policies are used together. Section 6 presents a generalization of our results in the case of stochastic N -th degree risk increase. Section 7 concludes.
The model
In this section we set up a simple model which compares choice made in the private sector with socially optimal choice. Following an approach widely used in the literature (see, for instance, Mohtadi 1996; Xepapadeas 2005) , 10 choice in the private sector is described by the behaviour of a representative consumer, 11 while the socially optimal choice is described by the choices made by a benevolent social planner. Different policy instruments will be then introduced in next sections.
We assume that consumer preferences are represented by a bivariate utility function U (c, q). The utility function depends on consumption c and on environmental quality level q, where c and q are expressed with different unit of measurement. U (c, q) is increasing and concave with regard to each argument and it is three times continuously differentiable with respect to c and q respectively. Letting U c = ∂U/∂c, U q = ∂U/∂q, U cc = ∂ 2 U/∂c 2 , U cq = ∂ 2 U/∂c∂q and so on, these assumptions mean U c > 0, U q > 0, U cc < 0 and U< 0. We emphasize that this last assumption implies aversion toward environmental risk. We introduce this hypothesis since we want to compare optimal choice with and without uncertainty for agents who are affected by risk. For completeness we provide some results for the case of risk neutrality in Appendix A.
Consumption c is composed by exogenous income y and by income derived from production activity. Production activity is financed by investment s and generates an output given by f (s). As usual for production functions, we assume that f (s) is increasing and concave with regard to s, such that f (.) > 0 and f (.) < 0. Consumption c is thus given by c = y − s + f (s). 12 The value of q depends on the initial environmental quality level q 0 and on the damage function g(s), which expresses 10 The unique difference with reference to these two papers is that they examine a multiperiod framework while we are studying a static model. Other papers with a very similar approach are Smulders and Gradus (1996) , Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) and Angelopoulos et al. (2010) . 11 The use of a representative consumer implies that we assume all consumers in the private sector to be homogeneous. 12 Note that since the model is static, we have that investment s and production activity related to it are contemporaneous. This means that the agent has only to choose the optimal fraction of exogenous income y to be destined to production activity (which will depend on marginal productivity). For simplicity we call this fraction 'investment' even though the model does not exhibit any kind of capital accumulation. Note that this setting is equivalent to a framework where the production is carried out by a firm which maximizes its profit f (s) − s and that the consumer is the owner of the firm, so that the profit is a part of her income. the negative influence of pollution through investment in productive activities. Since larger production implies more pollution, we assume that g (.) > 0.
As in much literature on pollution and environment (e.g. Michel and Rotillon 1995; Mohtadi 1996; Helfand et al. 2003; Xepapadeas 2005; Angelopoulos et al. 2010) , we assume that pollution is an externality, meaning that consumers do not take it into account when they choose the optimal level of s. This assumption generates a difference between consumer behaviour and socially optimal choice, and justifies introducing taxation on polluting activity in the next sections. 13 A partially alternative approach will be discussed at the end of this section.
The consumer maximisation problem, which considers environmental quality level as given and equal to q 0 , is thus the following:
Optimal investment s is determined as the solution of the first-order condition, 14 which, after some computations, is equivalent to
Note that condition (2) simply implies the equality between marginal cost and marginal benefit of investment s. The externality related to pollution is neglected by the consumer, but considered by the planner. This means that, when we consider the planner's problem, we need to take the effect of s on q into account. So the planner's optimal choice is obtained by maximising
The first-order condition is
where s is the planner optimal investment level. We assume that the second-order condition ensuring
∂s 2 < 0 is satisfied. 15 This condition implies the equality between social marginal cost and marginal benefit of investment s. Note that both cost and 13 In fact, without the externality the consumer would limit emissions in order to avoid an excessive pollution and taxation on polluting activity would be not necessary. 14 It is clear that, given our assumption on U (c, q) and f (s) the second-order condition of the consumer's problem is satisfied. 15 The second-order condition for the planner problem is
Note that, given the previous assumptions on U (c, q) and f (s), the condition is automatically satisfied if g (s) ≥ 0 and U cq ≥ 0. This last assumption would mean that consumption and environmental quality level are complements. A similar hypothesis was made, for example, by Mohtadi (1996) , who shows that an improvement in environmental quality increases economic growth if U cq ≥ 0. benefit in (4) are measured in utils. The same is true for consumer's first-order condition before the simplification determining (2), due to the symmetric effect of cost and benefit on consumer's utility.
The comparison between s and s clearly shows that the consumer chooses a suboptimally larger investment level s due to pollution externality. 16 This suboptimal result can be removed by the planner by imposing a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal pollution damage. Furthermore, environmental quality level can be increased by means of abatement policies. The following sections compare the effects of the Pigouvian taxation and abatement policies under risk.
Before examining these effects, it is important to remember that, as explained above, the framework analyzed in this paper assumes that the consumer cares about environmental quality (we consider a two-argument utility function) but without taking into account the influence of her investment on it (generating an externality). 17 A partially different approach could assume that the consumer does not care about the environment (she has a one-argument utility) and the planner maximizes a weighted sum of consumer utility and environmental quality. In this case, we have that the consumer's maximization problem becomes
and the planner's problem becomes
where α and (1 − α) are the weights of consumer utility and environmental quality. In the first of these two problems it is clear that the consumer's first-order condition is exactly equal to (2). 18 In the planner's problem we get that socially optimal level of investment s is given by
It is clear that this condition is a particular case of (4) where
This occurs since the utility function
) can be seen as a separable formulation (i.e. a formulation where the cross-derivate U cq is null) of function
). Given this equivalence, the results obtained using the framework described by Eqs. (1) and (3) also hold for the alternative framework described by Eqs. (5) and (6).
Pigouvian tax and uncertainty
The excess of investment in the consumer's optimal choice shown in the previous section can be removed by means of a Pigouvian tax, i.e. a tax proportional to investment equal to marginal pollution damage. If we introduce the Pigouvian tax T p , the consumer's problem becomes
Consumer's optimal investment s is thus determined in this case by the first-order condition 19, 20 f s − 1 = T p .
This means that Eq. (7) defines the decreasing relationship ( f (s) is decreasing in s) between optimal investment level and Pigouvian taxation. Given this condition, the consumer optimal choice coincides with the socially optimal investment (s = s ) if the planner chooses the optimal level of T p such as f (s) − 1 = T p . 21 In this context we can introduce two alternative types of environmental risk: 'risk on environmental quality level' (q 0 random) or 'risk on the effect of pollution' (g(s) random). Note that the second case describes risk on the effect of human activities on the environment, while the first considers risk on environment features. For this reason, the case of q 0 random can represent a situation where we have risk on the present level of environmental deterioration, but also a situation where we have risk on the possible occurrence of natural disasters not related to human activities (like, for instance, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions). 22 Before studying optimal Pigouvian taxation under different kinds of risk, a general premise concerning consumer behaviour should be stated. Since all risks analyzed involve the environment and since we assume that the consumer takes environmental quality as given in her choice, consumer optimal behavior under environmental risk is 19 Obviously the condition implies equality between the new marginal cost of investment (incorporating the tax) and investment marginal benefit. 20 Note that we introduce Pigouvian tax as a tax on polluting investment s. Alternatively it could be introduced as a tax on output f (s). It is easy to see that, in this case, the first-order condition of consumer's problem (3) would become (1 − T p ) f (s ) − 1 = 0 where T p is the level of Pigouvian tax on output. Considering this together with (7) we get T p = 1 − 1 T p +1 , implying that T p is an increasing function of T p . For this reason, the results on the larger or smaller size of T p under risk, derived later on, are also correct for T p . 21 Note that, using (4) and (7), we also have the explicit value of T p given by
the same as we have in the certainty case. To clarify this point, consider for instance the case where q 0 is random. In this case, the consumer maximization problem becomes
Computing the consumer first-order condition shows that it is equal to (7).
It is important to note that this occurs for all the kinds of environmental risk studied in this paper, so that Eq. (7) describes consumer behavior in all the cases analyzed below.
Unlike consumer behavior, the socially optimal level of taxation is determined by taking the effect on environment into account. This level is thus affected by environmental risk. For this reason, we will study the effect of each kind of environmental risk by examining how these risks affect planner's optimal choice.
(a) Risk on environmental quality
Firstly we study the case where q 0 is random. We define it asq 0 and its expected value as E(q 0 ) = q 0 . Let us denotes andT p the investment and tax level under risk, while s and T p are respectively investment and Pigouvian tax in the certainty case.
Under risk, the planner's maximisation problem becomes
Computing the planner's first-order condition we get
In this case too, onces is determined by (8), the planner can push the consumer to choose the socially optimal level of investment by considering Eq. (7), describing consumer's optimal behaviour. The planner should thus impose a Pigouvian tax such as f (s) − 1 =T p . Considering (4), (7) and (8) Proposition 1 shows that the comparison between the optimal level of Pigouvian tax with and without risk depends on the sign of third-order derivatives of the utility function. This conclusion is not unusual in the analysis of risk effects. The most important result in this field is the well-known condition ensuring precautionary saving in a univariate utility and two-period framework. As first shown by Leland (1968) and clearly explained by Kimball (1990) , 23 positive precautionary saving occurs in this case if the third derivative of the utility function (with regard to its unique argument) is positive.
Moving from a univariate to a bivariate utility framework, however, the role of Uand U cqq (called 'cross prudence' by Eeckhoudt et al. 2007 ) is shown in many works. In a bivariate utility two-period model, in particular, the signs of Uand U cqq are shown to determine precautionary saving in different contexts together with U ccc (see Courbage and Rey 2007; Menegatti 2009a,b) . Similarly the same derivatives are relevant for the determination of saving in the presence of correlated risks (see Denuit et al. 2011) . Finally, similar conditions affect the optimal choice of labor supply in a one period bivariate utility model of choice between consumption and leisure (see Chiu and Eeckhoudt 2010 ).
An interpretation of conditions U≥ 0 and U cqq ≤ 0 can be obtained starting from that of precautionary saving condition provided by Menegatti (2007) . 24 In fact, following Menegatti (2007) , the changes in the size of −Ucan be seen as a measure of the changes in the disutility due to risk on environmental quality. 25 Condition U≥ 0 ensures that this disutility is reduced if we increase environmental quality and thus if we reduce pollution. Condition U cqq ≤ 0 ensures that this disutility is reduced if we decrease consumption and thus if we reduce investment (s ≤ s) below its optimal value determined by condition (4). In conclusion, both the effects described above are related to prudence. The first is a kind of 'prudence about the environment' (greater risk on the environment implies that a better environmental level is desirable), while the second is a kind of negative cross-prudence (greater risk on the environment implies that less consumption is desirable). These two facts together imply that, under risk, we prefer less investment and less pollution.
(b) Risk on the impact of pollution
We now turn to risk on the pollution effect. For simplicity, we assume that the damage function g(s) is linear defining g(s) = ks. Note that under this assumption, Eq. (4) becomes
Under this assumption we introduce risk on parameter k. We denotek as random value of k and its expected value as E(k) = k. As before, we denote ass andT p investment and Pigouvian tax under risk. The planner's maximisation problem now becomes
On this see also Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) .
). The index (., .) is called utility premium (or generalized risk measure) and it is a measure of the disutility caused by uncertainty. Following Stone (1970) and Menegatti (2007) we have that, for small risks, (., .
implying a first order condition given by
As in the previous case, condition (9) and (10) determine the socially optimal levels of investment respectively without risk (s) and under risk (s). Given these optimal levels, T p andT p are determined by Eq. (7). By comparing (9) and (10) and using (7), we get 
Proof See Appendix B.
In the case of risk on the pollution effect, we have a higher Pigouvian tax if U cqq ≤ 0 and −ks
The first condition is the same as obtained in the case of risk on environmental quality, and its interpretation is the same too. The second condition is different from the previous case. In order to explain it, it must first be emphasised that the index −ks
is a relative prudence index. 26 The level of relative prudence has been proved to be relevant in cases where a return is uncertain. In particular, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) showed that risk on the interest rate (the return of saving) increases saving if the index of relative prudence is larger than 2. Similarly Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) showed that the same conditions in Proposition 2 ensure that risk on wages raises the labor supply. 27 These two results together indicate that a condition of relative prudence is related to risk on returns (either the returns from saving or the return from labor).
The interpretation of condition −ks
in Proposition 2 is consistent with these conclusions. Indeed, in our framework, parameter k measures the effect of a unit of investment on pollution, and it is thus a kind of 'negative return' of investment in terms of pollution. For this reason, as in the problems cited above, the effect of risk on it depends on the index of absolute prudence. Furthermore, the difference in our condition compared to that in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) (a threshold level of −2 instead of 2) occurs since the effect is here a negative return instead of a positive return (we like interest and we dislike pollution). 28 26 Following Pratt (1964) and Kimball (1990) for an univariate utility function U (x) we can define the following indexes:
. 27 Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) showed that these conditions are sufficient for an increase in labor supply, in case of a mean-preserving spread in wages. The comparison between a known level of wage and a random one can be seen as a specific case of mean-preserving spread. 28 On this last conclusion see also the results in next section.
Abatement policies and uncertainty
In the previous section we introduced a Pigouvian tax in order to reduce pollution. We now turn to a different policy to improve environmental quality: abatement policy. Abatement (or cleanup) activities can in general be seen as a policy, financed by a lump sum tax (T a ), aimed at reducing environmental degradation due to pollution and increasing environmental quality. 29 It is important to note that this instrument is completely different from the previous one since it does not affect the level of investment s and the level of emissions due to it. 30 The policy introduced here is simply a policy which improves environmental quality, and its optimal implementation does not influence the agent's decision problem. 31 For this reason, the terms f (s ) − s and g(s ) in the maximization problem could be removed in this context. Furthermore implementation of the abatement policy is not specifically linked to the presence of an externality related to pollution. In fact, an optimal abatement policy could also be introduced into a framework where consumers take pollution into account (i.e. in the absence of externalities), if the planner can intervene in order to improve environmental quality.
Nevertheless, in order for the paper to have a unified framework, we retain the terms f (s ) − s and g(s ) in our specification. We emphasize, however, that the problems in Sect. 3 and in Sect. 4 are different and distinct. The two instruments (and the two problems) will be considered together in Sect. 5.
We assume that the effect of the abatement policy is described by a linear function so that for each tax unit paid we have an increase of m in environmental quality. 32 Given consumer choice, the planner defines the optimal abatement tax level by solving 29 The United Nations defines pollution abatement as technology applied or measure taken to reduce pollution and/or its impacts on the environment (see United Nations 1997). A more accurate terminology would distinguish between 'abatement' and 'mitigation' in pollution and climate change issues respectively. Since our analysis focuses on the role of risk on the environment, this paper aims to study a generic framework which can, in principle, be applied to different environmental problems. For this reason, we use here the word 'abatement' which should be interpreted with a wide meaning. 30 Given the abatement tax T a , the consumer's maximization problem is a simple modification of the problem in Sect. 2, given by
Computing the first-order condition, it is easy to see that the optimal investment s is still determined by Eq. (2) and does not depend on T a . The reason of this result is that the optimal level of investment is determined only by the equality between its marginal cost (−1) and its marginal benefit ( f (s)). If this equality is satisfied then the investment maximizes the (after-tax) level of consumption, whatever the level of exogenous income and whatever the level of tax T a (which is exogenous for consumer too). Finally an unchanged level of s also implies that emissions (i.e. gross pollution) are unchanged. The policy reduces however environmental degradation (i.e. net pollution). 31 A very simple example of the kind of policy introduced in this section can be, for instance, a public intervention (financed by a lump sum tax) which plants new trees. 32 A linear abatement is used for instance by Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) and by Gupta and Barman (2009). the following problem
The first-order condition of this problem is 33
where T a is the optimal abatement tax.
In this context, we can introduce two alternative types of environmental risk: 'risk on environmental quality level' (q 0 random) or 'risk on the effect of the abatement policy' (m random).
(a) Risk on environmental quality
First we study the case when q 0 is random. We define it as q 0 and its expected value as E(q 0 ) = q 0 . We also denote asT a the abatement tax under risk. Under risk the previous maximisation problem becomes
The first-order condition is now
Comparing (11) and (12) Proof See Appendix B.
The sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 are the same as Proposition 1, and their interpretation is similar too. Conditions U cqq ≤ 0 and U≥ 0 ensure that the disutility due to risk is reduced when consumption decreases and environmental quality is improved. This implies that we choose larger abatement under risk.
(b) Risk on the impact of abatement policy
We now study the second type of risk: risk on the effect of abatement policy. We thus consider m random and we denote it asm and its expected value E(m) as m. In this case the maximisation problem and the first-order condition become respectively
Comparing (11) and (13) 
Sufficient conditions obtained in this case are similar to those in the case of the effect of risk on pollution. In particular, condition U cqq ≤ 0 is exactly the same and has an analogous interpretation. Condition −mT a UU≥ (≤)2 is similar to that obtained in Proposition 2 and is equivalent to that derived by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) . As explained in Sect. 2, this condition is related to risk on returns, and, consistently, abatement performance (now uncertain) is the return of the abatement policy. Furthermore, unlike the case of k in Sect. 3, return here is positive (policy improves environmental quality level), so the threshold level is exactly the same as determined by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) .
Finally it should be noted that we introduced the abatement tax as a lump-sum tax. An alternative would be a tax proportional to investments, i.e. that the abatement policy is financed by a tax on the polluting investment. In this case, the term T a in the first argument of planner's utility function would be replaced by the term sT a . We emphasized that, although it could be plausible, this alternative is not a completely efficient scheme. In fact, in this case, tax T a has the two aims of reducing investment to its socially optimal level (like the Pigouvian tax of Sect. 3) and financing the optimal abatement on pollution. For this reason, even in the case of certainty, its level would reflect the balance between these different objectives. A more efficient way to pursue the two objectives is to use a specific policy instrument for each: a Pigouvian tax to control investment and a lump-sum tax to finance abatement policies. A model with these two instruments together is studied in Sect. 5.
A Pigouvian tax and abatement policy model
In this section we introduce both instruments together, using a framework where the policy maker uses both an abatement policy and a Pigouvian tax. In this case, the planner chooses socially optimal levels of investment (s) and abatement policies (T a ), solving the following problem
Note that this problem seems similar to that in Sect. 4. The difference between them is that, in the model in this section, s is chosen by the planner (since it is determined by the Pigouvian tax T p ) while, in the model in Sect. 4, the value of s is exogenously given. The maximisation implies
From (14) and (15) we get
and
Given (16) and (17) we have that
Once the optimal investment s is determined by (18), we compute T a by substituting it in (14). Finally, given (7), the optimal level of T p is obtained. 34 Previous conditions clearly indicate a separation of the objectives of Pigouvian tax and abatement policy. Pigouvian tax is used in order to guarantee a level of investment s which satisfies condition (18). The left-hand side of this equation can be seen as the ratio of monetary net marginal positive return of investment s on consumption (which is equal to f (s) − 1) and monetary marginal cost of abatement policy on consumption (which is equal to 1). The right-hand side is the ratio between the marginal negative effect of pollution due to environment (equal to k) and the marginal positive effect of abatement policy on environment (equal to the investment m). This condition can thus be seen as a condition requiring the equality between the 'relative marginal positive return' of the two policies in term of consumption and the 'relative marginal negative effect/cost' of the two policies in terms of environmental quality. The Pigouvian tax 34 Note that (7) still holds since consumer's maximization problem is the same of Sect. 3. is thus used for this purpose. Once this efficiency condition is satisfied, we need to balance the effects in terms of utils of the two instruments. This is guaranteed by the optimal choice of T a in (14). Abatement policy is thus focused on this second goal.
Given these premises, we can now introduce different kinds of risk. In this model we can have three types of environmental risk: risk on environmental quality level (q 0 random), risk on the effect of pollution (k random) and risk on the effect of the abatement policy (m random). In all three cases, we use notation from previous sections in order to indicate random variables (i.e.,q 0 ,m andk) and we denote ass,T p andT a investment, Pigouvian tax and abatement tax under risk respectively.
(a) Risk on environmental quality
We first examine the case when q 0 is random. The planner's maximisation problem will be:
The first-order conditions are
Simple computations show that, in this case, condition (18) still holds, so that
Again, once the optimal investments is obtained, we computeT a by substituting it in (19). Finally, the level ofT p is obtained by (7). By comparing conditions (14), (15), (18) and (19), (20), (21) we have
Proposition 5 Given risk on environmental quality: (a)T p = T p and (b) conditions U cqq ≤ (≥)0 and U qqq ≥ (≤)0 are sufficient to haveT a ≥ (≤)T a .
We analyze the interpretation of these results after studying the other types of risk.
(b) Risk on the impact of abatement
When m is random, the maximisation problem becomes
Simple computations show that in this case, condition (18) is replaced by
As before, once the optimal investments is obtained, we computeT a by substituting it in (22). Finally, the level ofT p is obtained by (7). By comparing conditions (14), (15), (18) and (22), (23) and (24) we get
Proposition 6 Given risk on abatement, (a)T p > T p and (b) conditions U cqq ≥ 0 and U qqq ≤ 0 are sufficient to haveT a < T a .
In this case too, the interpretation of the proposition is provided below.
(c) Risk on the effect of pollution
Finally we examine the case where k is random. In this case, the maximisation problem becomes
Simple computations show that in this case condition (18) is replaced by
As in the previous cases, once the optimal investments is obtained, we computeT a by substituting in (25). Finally, the level ofT p is obtained by (7). By comparing conditions (14), (15), (18) and (25), (26), (27) Proof See Appendix B.
Propositions 5, 6 and 7 show the effects on q 0 , k and m respectively under risk. Considering them together, we can now interpret the conclusions obtained. We start by considering T p . As we mentioned, the Pigouvian tax is used by the planner in order to guarantee the equality between the relative marginal positive return in terms of consumption and the relative marginal negative effect/cost in terms of pollution of the two policies. This fact justifies the different results obtained in point (a) of Propositions 5, 6 and 7.
In fact, when q 0 is random, risk affects neither marginal returns of the policies nor their marginal costs. This implies that, the choice of T p in this case is the same as the one under certainty.
On the contrary, when k is random, we have that the expected marginal cost of pollution rises (See the role of the covariance in the proof of Proposition 7). The increase in the expected marginal cost requires an increase in marginal return of investment. This implies in turn a smaller s and a larger T p .
Similarly, when m is random, the expected marginal abatement performance decreases (See the role of the covariance in the proof of Proposition 6) becoming smaller than the expected marginal cost. This also requires an increase in marginal return of investment in order to recover the equality between relative marginal return and relative marginal cost. This implies in turn a smaller s and a larger T p .
Consider now the effect on T a . As shown at the beginning of this section, T a is used in order to guarantee the balance of the effect of the two instruments used by the planner in terms of utils. Whatever the type of risk, q 0 , k or m, this balance cannot be guaranteed by the pair of values, T p , T a , since the disutility due to risk must somehow be counteracted.
As shown before, when q 0 is random, the value of T p does not change. This implies that the disutility due to risk must be totally counteracted by the change in T a . Given this conclusion, change in the value of T a depends on the features of the third-order derivatives of the utility function, for the reasons explained in the comment to Proposition 1.
When either k or m is random, the picture is more complicated. In fact, as shown before, in these two cases, the level of T p increases. This obviously has an effect on marginal utility. When U cqq ≥ 0 and U≤ 0, the change of T p strengthens the effect of disutility due to risk. So the level of T a must surely decrease in order to counteract it. When U cqq ≤ 0 and U≥ 0, on the other hand, the increase in T p counteracts the effect of the disutility due to risk. This implies that, in general, we cannot say if T a has to increase, decrease or remain unchanged. This last reasoning explains the asymmetry in the inequalities in Propositions 6 (b) and 7 (b) with regard to the results in the previous propositions.
Generalization to the N-th order risk changes
In the previous sections we considered three kinds of risk related to variables q 0 , k and m. In particular, we compared the optimal choice when one of these variables is certain with the optimal choice when the same variable is random, under the assumption that the expected value of the variable in the uncertainty case is equal to the given value of the variable in the certainty case. This means that the comparison is in fact a comparison between two random variables with same expected value and different variance (zero in one case, positive in the other). It can thus be interpreted as a change in the second-order moment of the distribution of the random variable given the first-order moment.
This interpretation is relevant if it is related to a taxonomy of risk changes first introduced by Ekern (1980) and recently reconsidered by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) . In particular, Ekern (1980) introduced the general concepts of N -th degree stochastic dominance and N -th degree increase in risk, related to an increase in the N -th moment of a risky distribution, given the invariance of the N − 1 previous moments. Formal definitions of the concepts of N -th degree stochastic dominance and N -th degree increase in risk are as follows.
Let F and G be the cumulative distribution of the two random variables y and x, defined on a probability support contained within an open interval (a, b). Define It is clear that in this framework the comparisons presented in previous sections are second-degree risk changes. This suggests that the previous results can be generalized to the case of a N -th degree risk change. In particular, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) provide a characterisation of N -th degree risk changes related to the sign of the derivates until order N of an expected univariate utility function. In a recent paper, Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) generalise these results to the case of a bivariate utility. Their characterisation can be summarised as follows 35
Lemma 8 Defining U (i),( j) as the i-th order partial derivate with regard to the first argument and the j-th order partial derivate with regard to the second argument of U (., .), we have that (a) for x being an N -th degree risk increase over y, EU (a, x) ≤ (≥)EU (a, y) if and only if (−1) N U (0),(N ) ≤ (≥)0; (b) for y dominating x via N -th degree stochastic dominance, EU (a, x) ≤ (≥) EU (a, y) if and only if
This Lemma can be used to generalise some from the results in the previous sections. Letting T p (q 1 ), T a (q 1 ) and s(q 1 ) as the optimal level of T p , T a and s given 
Proof See Appendix B. Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 11 Assume m random and thatm 2 is an N -th degree risk increase ofm
Corollary 12
Assume m random and thatm 1 dominatesm 2 via N -th degree stochastic dominance. Conditions −mT a
Proposition 13 Assume k random and thatk 2 is an N -th degree risk increase ofk 1 . Conditions (−1) N ks
Corollary 14
Assume k random and thatk 1 dominatesk 2 via N -th degree stochastic dominance. Conditions (−1) n (ks)
Propositions 9, 11 and 13 generalise some results obtained in the previous sections. Note that this generalisation does not involve the results obtained in the model with both Pigouvian tax and abatement policy. This is because we cannot generalise the conclusions on the changes of T p obtained in this model, specifically related to the sign of covariances, to an N -th order risk change.
Once the generalisation is performed, it has various possible applications. The literature on risks provides the interpretation of risk changes of many different orders. 36 Some of these interpretations can be simply applied to the case of risk on the environment.
First, consider the case of a first-degree increase in risk (N = 1 in the previous propositions) and assume q 0 is random. This is a situation where we consider a reduction in first-order moment of the distribution of q 0 . This occurs for example if climate change implies a lower expected environmental quality. 37 Second, consider the case of a third-degree increase in risk (N = 3 in the previous propositions) and assume again q 0 is random. Menezes et al. (1980) study a third-degree risk increase as a downside risk increase, i.e. as a increase in the left skewness of a distribution. 38 In our framework, a case of a third-degree increase in risk in q 0 , could thus be seen as an increase in the probability of very bad outcomes in environmental quality, for given expected value and variance of q 0 . 39 Finally, consider a fourth degree risk increase case (N =4 in the previous proposition). In this case, for given expected value, variance and skewness we have an increase in the kurtosis of the distribution (see Menezes and Wang 2005) . For example, this could be climate change which affects temperature level determining an increase in the probability of high and low temperatures, but keeping constant the expected value, the variance and the skewness of the temperature distribution. 40 These considerations show how the results in Proposition 9, 11 and 13 generalize the conclusions in the previous sections. Sections 3, 4 and 5 study policy reaction when we introduce environmental risk, i.e. in case of a change in the variance of environmental quality, pollution effect or abatement effect. The results in this section analyze this reaction when the change occurs in other moments of the random variables describing environmental risks, such as skewness and kurtosis or even higher-order moments. Propositions 9, 11 and 13 show that the conclusions derived in these cases 36 On this see Menezes et al. (1980) , Menezes and Wang (2005) , Schlesinger (2006, 2008) . 37 Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) , who study a two-period consumption problem, suggest that a firstdegree risk change can occur in that framework when the probability of becoming unemployed increases, reducing future expected income. Similarly, in our case, a first-degree risk change can occur when the probability of an environmental accident increases, and future expected environmental quality is lowered. 38 Menezes et al. (1980) show that this can be obtained by applying a mean preserving spread and a mean preserving contraction with specific feature. 39 Note that, in a very recent paper, Pindyck (2009) studies the economic impact of global warming, considering not the expected climate change but the implications of the different features of the distribution of the random variable describing future changes in temperature (represented by a three-parameter gamma distribution). His calibrations show that a change in the skewness of the distribution for given expected value and variance (i.e. a third-degree change in risk) can significantly affect agents optimal behaviour. 40 With regard to the implications of a large kurtosis, see also the discussion on the 'Dismal Theorem' in the Conclusions. involve conditions which are similar to those of the case where variance changes but pertain to higher-order derivates of the utility function.
Conclusions
This paper studies the implication of three kinds of environmental risk: risk on environmental quality, risk on the effect of pollution and risk on the impact of abatement for two different environmental policies (Pigouvian tax and abatement policy) used either alternatively or contemporaneously.
In the two cases where we use either Pigouvian tax or abatement policy, we determine the conditions ensuring that the introduction of risk brings about an increase in the size of public intervention (a higher Pigouvian tax or a larger abatement) and vice versa. In the case of risk on environmental quality, these conditions involve the signs of two third-order derivatives of the utility function (Uand U cqq ). The results for Uare linked to a wide strand of literature, starting from Leland (1968) , Sandmo (1970) and Kimball (1990) , showing the role of prudence for precautionary saving in a one-argument utility framework. 41 Similarly, the role of U cqq in decisions under risk has recently been emphasized by many papers (e.g. Courbage and Rey 2007; Menegatti 2009a,b; Denuit et al. 2011; Chiu and Eeckhoudt 2010) which consider a two-argument utility. In this field, our conclusions confirm the role of third-order cross derivatives of the utility function in the determination of optimal choices under risk. Furthermore, the interpretation of the conditions obtained shows that, as in the case of precautionary saving analysis (see Menegatti 2007; Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2006) , the reason that the signs of these derivates are relevant is their ability to indicate the direction of the effect on the disutility due to risk of change in consumption level or environmental quality.
The effects of risk on pollution impact and abatement impact (either Pigouvian tax or abatement policy) are, on the other hand, shown to depend on the size of relative prudence. This result is consistent with those obtained by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) in the field of optimal saving under risk on the interest rate (the return of saving) and by Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) in the field of optimal labour supply under risk on wage (the return of labour). We showed that this parallelism occurs, because in our analysis risk involves two kinds of returns: the positive return of abatement policy or the negative return of investment in terms of pollution.
When Pigouvian tax and abatement policy are used together we have a kind of separation of the two policy instruments. In particular, the Pigouvian tax is used to guarantee equality between the relative marginal positive return in terms of consumption and the relative marginal negative effect/cost in terms of pollution of the two policies. This implies that the Pigouvian tax level is increased by risk on both pollution effect and abatement effect, since the former raises the expected marginal cost of pollution and the latter reduces the expected marginal return of investment. Finally, risk on environmental quality affects neither expected marginal returns nor expected marginal costs of the two policies, so that it does not influence Pigouvian tax.
Again, when Pigouvian tax and abatement policy are used together, the abatement policy is applied in order to guarantee the balance between the effects of the two policy instruments in terms of utils and thus also counteracts the disutility caused by risk. When environmental quality is uncertain, given that the Pigouvian tax does not change, abatement tax is the only instrument used to counteract the disutility due to risk. It thus exhibits a change in a direction clearly determined by the features of the third-order derivatives of the utility function. When risk is on either pollution effect or abatement effect, the level of Pigouvian tax increases, so that a clear indication on the change of the abatement tax can be obtained only where the change in Pigouvian tax strengthens the disutility due to risk, making necessary an increment in the level of the other instrument.
The last part of the paper shows how some of our results can be generalized to the case of N -th order risk change. This kind of shock, first studied by Ekern (1980) , has recently been rediscovered by literature (e.g. Schlesinger 2006, 2008) because of its applicability to cases of change in random variables distribution other than increases in variance. Our analysis shows which conditions, involving N -th order derivatives of the utility function, allow us to determine the directions of the effects of these shocks on some optimal policy choices.
Finally, it is important to note that our results can be interpreted in two different ways. On one hand, they provide a clear indication of the way policy variables change under risk once the features of the planner's utility function are determined. In this field thus, given preferences, we obtain conclusions on the impact of environmental risk on optimal policies. On the other hand, the results also allow us to compare the implications of different utility functions in terms of response to environmental risk. In this field they are thus useful for the selection of models describing preferences. This last conclusion is particularly relevant in the light of the debate on the implication of Weitzman's (2009a, b, c) Dismal Theorem for the analysis of climate change. Weitzman argues that structural uncertainty, characterising global warming, implies fat tails for the distribution of risk related to climate change. He also shows that the combination of an heavy-tailed distribution and a large but specific class of utility function (the family of power utilities, largely used in economic models) implies fragility of the expected utility theory. 42 Leaving aside the debate on the plausibility of Weitzman premise on the distribution of risk due to global warming, 43 which lies outside the scope of this paper, one implication of Weitzman's critique is that, in the analysis of long-run cost and benefit of environmental policies, we should use specifications different from the standard ones. This pertains to various aspects of cost-benefit models, including the form of the utility function. For this reason, one of the possible solutions for Weitzman's critique is to replace power utility functions with functions 42 In particular Geweke (2001) proves this result for CRRA utility function. Weitzman (2009a) claims that this should be applied to every power utility functions where the relative risk aversion coefficient is positive, even if it is not constant for a change in the consumption level. Finally Nordhaus (2009) argues that a necessary condition for the fragility of the expected utility theory is that marginal utility tends to +∞ when consumption tends to zero. 43 On this issue see Nordhaus (2009) and Weitzman (2009c) . from a different family. In this field, our results, derived for a generic utility function, are not only immune from difficulties inherent in a power utility but can also help in the selection among utility functions different from that one, by providing general indications on its desired features.
Appendix A. Risk neutrality versus risk aversion
The focus of this paper on the comparison between optimal policy choices with and without uncertainty led us to analyze a framework where we assumed that preferences exhibit risk aversion (and in particular aversion to environmental risk). This appendix re-examines the model dealing with both abatement policy and a Pigouvian tax as in Sect. 5 considering the case of risk neutral preferences and compares the risk aversion and risk neutrality results where possible.
Since all the three kinds of risk discussed in this work pertain to the environment, the assumption of risk neutrality can be introduced by describing planner's preferences by means of a utility function which is separable and linear in the argument representing environmental quality. This utility function is thus
where U > 0 and U < 0. Note that, since we have no risk on consumption, this last assumption does not describe risk aversion and simply pertains to substitutability between consumption and environmental quality.
Given this utility function, we consider the planner's maximization problem in the four cases studied in Sect. 5: certainty, risk on environmental quality (q 0 random), risk on abatement effect (m random) and risk on pollution (k random). Planner's maximization problems in the four cases are respectively
First-order conditions for problem (28) implies (after some computations):
First-order conditions for problem (29) implies:
First-order conditions for problem (30) implies:
Finally, first-order conditions for problem (31) implies:
Since, by assumption, E[m] = m and E[k] = k. It is easy to see that (32), (34), (36) and (38) are equivalent and that (33), (35), (37) and (39) are equivalent. This provides a first result. The risk neutral planner chooses the same level of T p and T a in the certainty case and in the cases of the three kind of risks analysed. Furthermore, if we consider this result together with those in Sect. 5, we get a second conclusion. The risk neutral planner and the risk averse planner choose the same level for T p in the certainty case and in the case of risk on environmental quality. The risk averse planner chooses a level of T p larger than that chosen by the risk neutral planner in the cases of risks on pollution effect and on abatement effect.
Finally, no clear conclusion can be drawn with reference to the comparison of optimal levels of T a between the risk averse planner and the risk neutral planner, since the results on this comparison depend on the form of function U (c, q) (and in particular on its derivate U q ).
. These results, together with (4), imply that
By the second-order condition we know that ∂ 2 U ∂s 2 < 0 implying in turn that the lefthand side of (8) is decreasing in s. This, together with (40) impliess ≤ s. Now, given this result, we compare T p andT p . Since f (s) < 0, the function f (s) in (7) is decreasing in s. This, together withs ≤ s, impliesT p ≥ T p . The proof with reversed inequalities is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 2
We first compare s ands. To do this we substitute s in the lefthand side of (10) 
. By Jensen's inequality and since by assumption E(k) = k, U cqq ≤ 0 implies
Again, by Jensen's inequality, 
By the second-order condition, ensuring that the left-hand side of (10) is decreasing in s, (43) implies thats ≤ s. Finally, since f (s) in (7) is decreasing in s,s ≤ s implies T p ≥ T p . The proof with reversed inequalities is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to compareT a and T a , we evaluate (12) (whereT a is determined) for T a = T a . By Jensen's inequality and since
The two previous inequalities, together with (11), imply
Since, by second-order condition left-hand sides of (12) is decreasing in T a , this impliesT a ≥ T a . The proof with reversed inequalities is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 4
In order to compareT a and T a , we evaluate (13) (whereT a is determined) for T a = T a . By Jensen's inequality and since E(m) = m, U cqq ≤ 0 implies
Again by Jensen's inequality 
Finally, since by the second-order condition the left-hand side of (13) is decreasing in T a , (47) impliesT a ≥ T a . The proof with reversed inequalities is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of a) is trivial. Since (18) and (21) are equal s =s. By (7) this implies T p =T p . With reference to b), we compareT a and T a by evaluating (19) for T a = T a . By Jensen's inequality,
Given thats = s, these two conditions together imply that the left-hand side of (19), evaluated for T a = T a , is larger than the left hand side of (14) and thus is larger than zero. Since, by second-order conditions, (19) is decreasing in T a , this impliesT a ≥ T a . The proof with reversed inequalities is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 6
In order to order to prove a), we consider the left-hand side of (18) evaluated at s =s. Multiplying and dividing the fraction . We now compare it with the left-hand side of (24). Since the left-hand side of (18) 
By a) we know thats < s. Since 
Proof of Proposition 7
In order to prove (a), we compare the left-hand side of (27) with the left-hand side of (18) Since the left-hand side of (18) is decreasing in s, this last result implies s >s. By (7), this implies in turnT p > T p .
In order to prove (b) we define the left-hand side of (14) (14) and (25), this last result impliesT a < T a .
Proof of Proposition 9
We prove the proposition for one direction of the inequalities. The proof for the other direction is similar. We first prove (a). By Lemma 8 (a), 8) we know that when q 0 =q 1 and s = s(q 1 ), the lefthand side of (8) is null. This, together with the two previous inequalities derived by Lemma 8, implies that the left-hand side of (8) evaluated for q 0 =q 2 and s = s(q 1 ) is negative. Since the left-hand side of (8) (12) we know that when q 0 =q 1 and T a = T a (q 1 ), the left-hand side of (12) is null. This, together with the two previous inequalities derived by Lemma 8, implies that the left-hand side of (12) evaluated for q 0 =q 2 and T a = T a (q 1 ) is positive. Since the left-hand side of (12) is decreasing in T a , this implies T a (q 2 ) > T a (q 1 ).
Proof of Corollary 10
The corollary is proved by applying Lemma 8 (b) and following the same steps in the proof of Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 11
We prove the proposition for one direction of the inequalities. 
if (−1) N L(m) (0) ,(N ) ≥ 0. By differentiating L(m), it is easy to see that this inequality is equivalent to −mT a
